Items We have Concluded

  1. Agmon, Shai. ‘Undercutting Justice – Why Legal Representation Should Not Be Allocated by the Market’. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 20, no. 1 (2021): 99–123. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20951886.
  2. Albertsen, Andreas, and Sören Flinch Midtgaard. ‘Unjust Equalities’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 2 (2014): 335–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9442-3.
  3. Arneson, Richard. ‘Rethinking Luck Egalitarianism and Unacceptable Inequalities’: Philosophical Topics 40, no. 1 (2012): 153–69. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201240110.
  4. Arneson, Richard J. Prioritarianism. New edition. Cambridge University Press, 2022.
  5. Axelsen, David V., and Lasse Nielsen. ‘Harsh and Disrespectful: Rescuing Moral Agency from Luck and Choice’. Social Theory and Practice 46, no. 4 (2020): 657–79. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20201025101.
  6. Axelsen, David V., and Lasse Nielsen. ‘Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress: Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress’. Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2015): 406–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12048.
  7. Barnett, Zach. ‘Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 48, no. 4 (2020): 422–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12177.
  8. Benbaji, Yitzhak. ‘Sufficiency or Priority?’ European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 3 (2006): 327–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00228.x.
  9. Benbaji, Yitzhak. ‘The Doctrine of Sufficiency: A Defence’. Utilitas 17, no. 3 (2005): 310–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820805001676.
  10. Brake, Elizabeth. ‘Price Gouging and the Duty of Easy Rescue’. Economics & Philosophy 37, no. 3 (2021): 329–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626712000036X.
  11. Brighouse, Harry, and Adam Swift. ‘Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods’. Ethics 116, no. 3 (2006): 471–97. https://doi.org/10.1086/500524.
  12. Broome, John. ‘Equality Versus Priority: A Useful Distinction’. Economics and Philosophy 31, no. 2 (2015): 219–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267115000097.
  13. Brouwer, Huub, and Thomas Mulligan. ‘Why Not Be a Desertist?: Three Arguments for Desert and against Luck Egalitarianism’. Philosophical Studies 176, no. 9 (2019): 2271–88. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1125-4.
  14. Brown, Brookes. ‘Reciprocity Without Compliance’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 48, no. 4 (2020): 382–421. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12176.
  15. Butt, Daniel. ‘Option Luck, Gambling, and Fairness’. Ethical Perspectives 19, no. 3 (2012): 417–43.
  16. Carter, Ian. ‘Respect and the Basis of Equality’. Ethics 121, no. 3 (2011): 538–71. https://doi.org/10.1086/658897.
  17. Casal, Paula. ‘Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough’. Ethics 117, no. 2 (2007): 296–326. https://doi.org/10.1086/510692.
  18. Crisp, Roger. ‘In Defence of the Priority View: A Response to Otsuka and Voorhoeve’. Utilitas 23, no. 1 (2011): 105–8. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820810000488.
  19. Darwall, Stephen L. ‘Two Kinds of Respect’. Ethics 88, no. 1 (1977): 36–49. https://doi.org/10.1086/292054.
  20. Dillon, Robin S., ed. Dignity, Character and Self-Respect. Routledge, 1994. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203724040.
  21. Duus-Otterström, Göran. ‘Weak and Strong Luck Egalitarianism’. Contemporary Political Theory 11, no. 2 (2012): 153–71. https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2011.32.
  22. Dworkin, Ronald, and Justine Burley, eds. Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Philosophers and Their Critics 11. Blackwell Pub, 2004.
  23. Edmundson, William A. ‘What Are “The Means of Production”?*’. Journal of Political Philosophy 28, no. 4 (2020): 421–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12211.
  24. Elford, Gideon. ‘The Symmetry of Responsibility’. Journal of Social Philosophy 47, no. 3 (2016): 273–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12152.
  25. Eyal, Nir. ‘Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice’. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2006): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v2i1.19.
  26. Fleurbaey, Marc. ‘Freedom with Forgiveness’. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 4, no. 1 (2005): 29–67. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X05049435.
  27. Franzen, Jonas. ‘What (If Anything) Is Egalitarian about Luck Egalitarianism?’ Ethics, Politics & Society 7, no. 2 (2025). https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.7.2.5219.
  28. Frye, Harrison. ‘Rescuing the Market from Communal Criticism’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 51, no. 3 (2023): 234–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12235.
  29. Gilabert, Pablo. Human Dignity and Social Justice. OUP Oxford, 2023.
  30. Go, Johann. ‘Two-Level Luck Egalitarianism: Reconciling Rights, Respect, and Responsibility’. The Journal of Value Inquiry 55, no. 3 (2021): 543–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09752-3.
  31. Hausman, Daniel M. ‘Equality Versus Priority: A Misleading Distinction’. Economics & Philosophy 31, no. 2 (2015): 229–38. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267115000103.
  32. Herlitz, Anders. ‘The Indispensability of Sufficientarianism’. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22, no. 7 (2019): 929–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1479817.
  33. Hojlund, Anne‐Sofie Greisen. ‘What Should Egalitarian Policies Express? The Case of Paternalism’. Journal of Political Philosophy, ahead of print, 27 February 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12245.
  34. Holtug, Nils, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, eds. Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press, 2007.
  35. Huseby, Robert. ‘Sufficient Autonomy and Satiable Reasons’. Law, Ethics and Philosophy 5, no. 0 (2018): 154–63. https://doi.org/10.31009/LEAP.2017.V5.13.
  36. Inoue, Akira. ‘The Harshness Objection Is Not (Too) Harsh for Luck Egalitarianism’. Philosophia, ahead of print, 10 August 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00562-4.
  37. Kandiyali, Jan. ‘The Importance of Others: Marx on Unalienated Production’. Ethics 130, no. 4 (2020): 555–87. https://doi.org/10.1086/708536.
  38. Knight, Carl. ‘An Argument for All-Luck Egalitarianism’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 49, no. 4 (2021): 350–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12200.
  39. Knight, Carl, and Zofia Stemplowska. Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press, 2011.
  40. Lange, Benjamin. ‘Restricted Prioritarianism or Competing Claims?’ Utilitas 29, no. 2 (2017): 137–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820816000182.
  41. Lazenby, Hugh. ‘Mistakes and the Continuity Test’. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 15, no. 2 (2016): 190–205. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X15573462.
  42. Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. ‘Democratic Egalitarianism versus Luck Egalitarianism: What Is at Stake?’ Philosophical Topics, JSTOR, 2012, 117–34. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20124018.
  43. López-Guerra, Claudio. ‘Equal Subjects: Equal Subjects’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 45, no. 4 (2017): 321–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12101.
  44. Mack, Eric. ‘Two Demands Upon Luck Egalitarians’. Social Philosophy and Policy 39, no. 2 (2022): 233–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052523000298.
  45. Mancilla, Alejandra. Theories of Justice. Routledge, 2017. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315236322.
  46. McTernan, Emily. ‘The Inegalitarian Ethos: Incentives, Respect, and Self-Respect’. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12, no. 1 (2013): 93–111. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X12447777.
  47. Mills, Chris. ‘On the Limits of the Principle of Sufficient Autonomy’. Law, Ethics and Philosophy 5, no. 0 (2018): 164–74. https://doi.org/10.31009/LEAP.2017.V5.14.
  48. Mills, Eugene. ‘Scheffler on Rawls, Justice, and Desert’. Law and Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2004): 261–72. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4150553.
  49. Moriarty, Jeffrey. ‘Against the Asymmetry of Desert’. Noûs 37, no. 3 (2003): 518–36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3506126.
  50. Morton, Jennifer M. ‘The Miseducation of the Elite’. Journal of Political Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2021): 3–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12208.
  51. Mulkeen, Nicola. ‘Exploitation: Bridging Social and Distributive Egalitarianism’. Political Studies 68, no. 4 (2020): 954–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719882609.
  52. Nielsen, Lasse. ‘Shielding Sufficientarianism from the Shift’. Law, Ethics and Philosophy 5, no. 0 (2018): 142–53. https://doi.org/10.31009/LEAP.2017.V5.12.
  53. Nielsen, Lasse. ‘Sufficiency Grounded as Sufficiently Free: A Reply to Shlomi Segall: Sufficiency Grounded as Sufficiently Free’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2016): 202–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12159.
  54. Olsaretti, Serena, ed. Desert and Justice. Mind Association Occasional Series. Clarendon Press, 2003.
  55. Olsaretti, Serena, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice. First edition. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford University Press, 2018.
  56. O’Neill, Martin. ‘Priority, Preference and Value’. Utilitas 24, no. 3 (2012): 332–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000118.
  57. Otsuka, Michael, and Alex Voorhoeve. ‘Reply to Crisp’. Utilitas 23, no. 1 (2011): 109–14. https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382081000049X.
  58. Otsuka, Michael, and Alex Voorhoeve. ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 2 (2009): 171–99. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01154.x.
  59. Parfit, Derek. ‘Another Defence of the Priority View’. Utilitas 24, no. 3 (2012): 399–440. https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382081200009X.
  60. Persson, Ingmar. Inclusive Ethics. Oxford University Press, 2017.
  61. Porter, Thomas. ‘In Defence of the Priority View’. Utilitas 24, no. 3 (2012): 349–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000039.
  62. Ridge, Michael. ‘Voting for Less than the Best’. Journal of Political Philosophy, 23 February 2021, jopp.12244. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12244.
  63. Sandbu, Martin E. ‘On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck–Option-Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism’. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 3, no. 3 (2004): 283–312. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X04046243.
  64. Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.
  65. Scanlon, Thomas M. ‘Giving Desert Its Due’. Philosophical Explorations 16, no. 2 (2013): 101–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.787437.
  66. Scheffler, Samuel. ‘Membership and Political Obligation: Membership & Political Obligation’. Journal of Political Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2018): 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12125.
  67. Schouten, Gina. ‘Restricting Justice: Political Interventions in the Home and in the Market’. Philosophy & Public Affairs, JSTOR, 2013, 357–88.
  68. Segall, Shlomi. Health, Luck, and Justice. Princeton University Press, 2009.
  69. Segall, Shlomi. ‘In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism’. Social Theory and Practice 33, no. 2 (2007): 177–98. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200733224.
  70. Sher, George. ‘What Makes a Lottery Fair?’ Noûs 14, no. 2 (1980): 203. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214861.
  71. Shields, Liam. ‘The Prospects for Sufficientarianism’. Utilitas 24, no. 1 (2012): 101–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820811000392.
  72. Tan, Kok-Chor. ‘A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism’. The Journal of Philosophy 105, no. 11 (2008): 665–90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20620136.
  73. Temkin, Larry. ‘Equality as Comparative Fairness’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 34, no. 1 (2017): 43–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12140.
  74. Vandamme, Pierre-Étienne. ‘Why Not More Equality? Sufficientarianism and Inequalities above the Threshold’. Law, Ethics and Philosophy 5, no. 0 (2017): 130–41. https://doi.org/10.31009/LEAP.2017.V5.11.
  75. Vrousalis, Nicholas. ‘Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 41, no. 2 (2013): 131–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12013.
  76. Wasserman, David. ‘Let Them Eat Chances: Probability and Distributive Justice’. Economics and Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1996): 29–49. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100003709.
  77. Williams, Andrew. ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’ Utilitas 24, no. 3 (2012): 315–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000106.